

Message Text

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ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ISO-00 AID-05 ACDA-12 HA-05 CIAE-00
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R 270847Z JUL 78
FM AMEMBASSY ACCRA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4780
INFO SECDEFENSE WASHDC
JCS WASHDC //J-5//
USCINCEUR VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ4/7-SA//

S E C R E T NOFORN SECTION 1 OF 3 ACCRA 6053

NOFORN

DEPT PASS ACDA AND USAID

E.O. 11652: XGDS-2 DECLASS 12-31-2008
TAGS: MASS MPOL XX GH
SUBJ: ANNUAL INTEGRATED ASSESSMENT OF SECURITY ASSISTANCE
REF: (A) STATE 167901 (B) STATE 185943

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1. THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM PROVIDES ONE OF BEST
WAYS OF ESTABLISHING AND DEVELOPING CONTACT WITH GHANAIAN
MILITARY, GROUP WHICH HAS BEEN IN POWER SINCE 1972 AND WILL
CONTINUE TO PLAY IMPORTANT, POSSIBLY DECISIVE, DIRECT OR
INDIRECT ROLE IN GHANAIAN POLITICS. INFLUENCE OF US
PROFESSIONAL MILITARY TRAINING ON MORE THAN 300 MID-LEVEL
AND SENIOR OFFICERS OF GHANA ARMED FORCES BOTH ACTIVE AND
RETired HAS BEEN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION TOWARD GHANA'S
WESTERN ORIENTATION. SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IS
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VIRTUALLY ALL IMET AND ESSENTIALLY GRANT AID ALTHOUGH
REQUESTS FOR MORE TANGIBLE SECURITY ASSISTANCE MAY BE
FORTHCOMING UNDER NEW GOG. ALL TRAINING IS CONDUCTED IN
CONUS AND THUS PROVIDES MAXIMUM EXPOSURE OF GHANAIANS TO
US INFLUENCE. OUR INTERESTS IN MAINTAINING AND INFLUENCING
CONTACTS WITH GHANAIAN MILITARY ARE WELL SERVED BY SECURITY
ASSISTANCE PROGRAM.

THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM SEEKS TO MODERNIZE AND STANDARDIZE THE GHANA ARMED FORCES. OBJECTIVES ARE TO RAISE THE EDUCATIONAL AND TRAINING STANDARDS OF ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL, DEVELOP ADEQUATE ADMINISTRATIVE, TRAINING, MAINTENANCE AND SUPPLY SUPPORT BASE AND IMPROVE COMMAND AND CONTROL.

2. THE GOG PERCEIVES EXTERNAL THREAT BASED IN TOGO.

IRREDENTIST ELEMENTS OF THE EWE TRIBE ARE BELIEVED BY GOG TO BE PLOTTING, WITH CONNIVANCE OF GOVERNMENT OF TOGO, TO DETACH GHANA'S VOLTA REGION AND JOIN IN WITH TOGO. NO SPECIFIC STRATEGY, HOWEVER IS APPARENT TO MEET THIS PERCEIVED THREAT. THE NEAREST TROOPS TO THE TOGO BORDER ARE ASSIGNED TO GHANA'S ONE MORTAR REGIMENT WHICH IS A UNIT NOT EQUAL IN STRENGTH TO A US BATTALION. GOG ADMITS OF NO INTERNAL THREAT, BUT DISPOSITIONS OF ARMED FORCES ARE CALCULATED TO COUNTER SUCH A THREAT. ALL COMBAT TROOP INSTALLATIONS ARE LOCATED (ON MAIN ROADS) ADJACENT TO ALL MAJOR POPULATION CENTERS.

3. THE MISSION DISCOUNTS ANY EXTERNAL THREAT FROM GHANA'S NEIGHBORS. ADJACENT COUNTRIES ACTING SINGLY OR IN CONCERT WOULD NOT BE A MATCH FOR THE GHANA ARMED FORCES. THE MILITARY APPEARS TO BE FIRMLY ENTRENCHED AND ANY INTERNAL THREAT WOULD LIKELY COME FROM WITHIN THE MILITARY ITSELF AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE MILITARY COUP OF JULY 5, 1978 THAT

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BROUGHT LT. GENERAL AKUFFO TO POWER.

4. THE GOG APPEARS TO CONSIDER PRESENT ARMED FORCES ORGANIZATION ADEQUATE. SOME MODEST INCREASES IN STRENGTH FOR THE NAVY AND AIR FORCE HAVE BEEN MADE DUE TO RECENT ACQUISITION OF FOUR NEW PATROL CRAFT AND SIX NEW AIRCRAFT. GHANA ARMED FORCES TOTAL ABOUT 16,000 OFFICERS AND MEN ORGANIZED AS FOLLOWS:

ARMY: (12,500) TWO BRIGADES, SIX INFANTRY BATTALIONS WITH NOMINAL COMBAT AND SERVICE SUPPORT ELEMENTS.

NAVY: (1,200) TWO SMALL SHORE BASES, NINE CRAFT OF WHICH THE LARGEST ARE TWO SUB CHASERS.

AIR FORCE: (1,500) FORTY AIRCRAFT INCLUDE HELICOPTERS, SIX FOKKER F-27 AIRCRAFT, ONE FOKKER F-28 AIRCRAFT AND TWELVE AER-MACCHI JET TRAINER/FIGHTERS. THERE IS BORDER GUARD FORCE OF APPROXIMATELY 4,000 OFFICERS AND MEN ALSO A PART OF THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

5. THE GHANA ARMED FORCES ARE CONSIDERED ADEQUATE TO PERFORM THEIR MISSION. WHAT IS NEEDED IS REFINEMENT THROUGH MODERNIZATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND SUPPORT FUNCATIONS, UPGRADING OF TRAINING AND STANDARDIZATION OF

EQUIPMENT. GHANA DEPENDS ENTIRELY ON OVERSEAS PROCUREMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT. PRICE SHOPPING HAS RESULTED IN A POLYGLOT INVENTORY OF VEHICLES, WEAPONS AND AIRCRAFT. SOONER OR LATER GHANA WILL LIKELY SEEK A SINGLE SOURCE SUPPLIER FOR HER NEEDS. IT IS IMPORTANT, IF THE TIME COMES, THAT SUPPLIER BE WESTERN.

6. DEFENSE BUDGET, 1978-79: CEDI 183,249,000. FOREIGN EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS: CEDI 60,512,000. (FOR 1978 IMPORT

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LICENSE YEAR MOD HAS APPROVED OVERSEAS EXPENDITURES OF CEDI 72,000,000.) OVERALL MILITARY SPENDING HAS REMAINED AT A MODEST LEVEL. IN FY-77-78 THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BUDGET WAS ABOUT 5 PERCENT OF TOTAL PLANNED GOG EXPENDITURES. THE LATEST GNP DATA FOR GHANA IS FOR 1974 AND DRASIC INCREASES IN PRICES SINCE THEN AND A LACK OF DATA COMPLICATE ANY ESTIMATE OF THE GNP. THUS, COMPARISON OF MILITARY SPENDING WITH GNP IS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MAKE AT THIS TIME. PLANNED MILITARY IMPORTS FOR 1978 ACCOUNT FOR ABOUT 7 PERCENT OF TOTAL ESTIMATED IMPORTS. GHANA HAS A CONTINUING FOREIGN EXCHANGE CONSTRAINT AND ALL FOREIGN EXCHANGE TRANSACTIONS ARE OFFICIALLY REGULATED. AT THE PRESENT TIME THERE ARE NO DEBT SERVICE PROBLEMS.

7. N/A

8. GOG HAS INDICATED INTEREST IN THE FOLLOWING MAJOR ITEMS

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OF U.S. EQUIPMENT FOR FY-80. IF MADE, THESE PURCHASES
WILL BE U.S. COMMERCIAL BUYS.

TWO EACH C-130 AIRCRAFT (EST. COST: DOLLARS 23,000,000) TO
PROVIDE NEEDED AIRLIFT CAPABILITY TO GHANA FORCES. OBSOLETE
SKYVANS AND LIMITED LOAD F-27 AIRCRAFT DO NOT PROVIDE LIFT
CAPABILITY REQUIRED BY ARMED FORCES IN NATION OF FEW AND
POOR ROADS. SIXTEEN U.S. HELICOPTERS (EST. COST: DOLLARS
5,500,000). PRESENT HELICOPTER INVENTORY CONSISTS OF FOUR AIRCRAFT,
TWO ARE FRENCH ALLOUETTE III CRAFT AND TWO ARE U.S. BELL 212.
PURCHASE OF ADDITIONAL AIRCRAFT IS COMPATIBLE WITH ONGOING
MODERNIZATION PROGRAM AND WILL PROVIDE MUCH NEEDED FLEXIBILITY
DUE TO SHORTAGE OF FORWARD AREA AIRFIELDS AND POOR ROAD
CONDITIONS.

9. THE TOTAL COST OF THE ITEMS IN (8) ABOVE IS DOLLARS 28.5
MILLION, INCLUDING INITIAL TRAINING, SPARES AND MAINTENANCE. THIS
AMOUNT IS A TINY PROPORTION OF GHANA'S ESTIMATED IMPORT
BILL OF AROUND DOLLARS 750 MILLION. BECAUSE OF THE FOREIGN
EXCHANGE CONSTRAINT, POOR MANAGEMENT, AND DISORTIONS
IN THE ECONOMY, SHORTAGES OF IMPORTED GOODS ARE USUAL.
THE SCARCE FOREIGN EXCHANGE SPENT ON MILITARY AIRCRAFT COULD
BE USED TO IMPORT RAW MATERIALS AND CAPITAL EQUIPMENT
THAT COULD CREATE EMPLOYMENT IN INDUSTRY AND AGRICULTURE
AND BOOST EXPORTS, OR AT LEAST REDUCE IMPORTS OF CONSUMER
GOODS AND FOOD.

10. GIVEN NEW GOG POLICY TO SEEK RAPPROCHEMENT WITH TOGO
ON BORDER DISPUTE, IT IS HIGHLY UNLIKELY THAT MODEST
ACQUISITIONS ENVISAGED WILL HAVE ANY IMPACT ON REGIONAL
STABILITY. THE ARMS CONTROL IMPACT OF ANY PRESENT OR POTENTIAL
REQUESTS FOR SALES ARE THEREFORE NEGLIGIBLE.

11. THE CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN GHANA OF JULY 5, 1978

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AND THE SUBSEQUENT ACTIONS BY HEAD OF STATE, LIEUTENANT
GENERAL AKUFFO HAVE HAD POSITIVE IMPACT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
SITUATION IN GHANA. PRISONERS AND DETAINEES HELD SINCE
REFERENDUM WERE RELEASED DAY AFTER THE PALACE COUP. A
GENERAL AMNESTY WAS DECLARED FOR ALL IN SELF-IMPOSED EXILE
ABROAD. THE GOVERNMENT HAS ALSO MADE PUBLIC COMMITMENTS TO

THE RETURN TO "CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT" BY JULY 1979. AS PART OF THAT PLEDGE, SOME CORRUPT MILITARY LEADERS IN CIVILIAN POSITIONS HAVE ALREADY BEEN REASSIGNED TO MILITARY JOBS OR RETIRED. THESE TWO ACTIONS MAKE A START IN REMOVING MAJOR STUMBLING BLOCKS TO IMPROVED U.S.-GHANAIAN RELATIONS THAT HAVE PERSISTED FOR SOME TIME UNDER REGIME OF GENERAL ACHEAMPONG. THE NEW HEAD OF STATE HAS ALREADY SIGNALLED THAT HE WILL REQUEST ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE FROM U.S.

12. FY -80 FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE IS PROJECTED AT DOLLARS 600,000 THEN DROPPING TO DOLLARS 400,000 FOR THE FORE-SEEABLE FUTURE. ALL ASSISTANCE IS FOR TRAINING PURPOSES AND ALL IS FROM BRITISH COMMONWEALTH NATIONS. GHANA RECEIVES CONSIDERABLE ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S., CANADA, THE U. K. AND THE FRG. OTHER WESTERN NATIONS SUCH AS THE NETHERLANDS, DENMARK, FRANCE AND AUSTRALIA HAVE MORE MODEST AID EFFORTS. EASTERN BLOCK COUNTRIES ALSO HAVE MODEST AID PROGRAMS, MOSTLY TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE. MULTILATERAL AGENCIES SUCH AS THE WORLD BANK, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY AND THE UNDP ALSO HAVE EXTENSIVE AID PROGRAMS. THE ASSISTANCE COMMITMENTS OF THESE AND OTHER MULTILATERAL AGENCIES IN FY-1977 WERE DOLLARS 61.0 MILLION. USAID'S ASSISTANCE TO GHANA IN FY-77, INCLUDING LOANS AND GRANTS, WAS DOLLARS 5.1 MILLION.

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13 (A). LEVEL 1 PROGRAM (IMET ONLY). GRANT AID- DOLLARS 100,000. PROVDE TRAINING OF 20 TO 25 OFFICERS IN SELECTED COURSES. DUE TO IMPORTANCE OF IMET TO GHANA ARMED FORCES, WERE TRAINING TO DROP BELOW 20 OFFICERS YEARLY, IT IS HIGHLY DOUBTFUL THAT US OBJECTIVES RELATED TO THE SECURITY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM COULD BE MET.

13 (B). LEVEL 2 PROGRAM (IMET ONLY). GRANT AID - DOLLARS 175,000. THIS WOULD TRAIN AS ESTMATED 25 TO 30 OFFICERS AND IS CONSIDERED MARGINAL TO MEET US OBJECTIVES.

13 (C) LEVEL 3 PROGRAM (IMET ONLY). GRANT AID - DLS 275,000. THIS LEVEL WOULD PROVIDE TRAINING FOR AN ESTIMATED 60 TO 65 OFFICERS (BASED ON FY-78 PROGRAM) AND IS CONSIDERED OPTIMUM. THE IMET PROGRAM SHOULD LEVEL OFF AT 60 TO 65 STUDENT LEVEL. BEYOND THAT THE GHANA ARMED FORCES HAS SOME DIFFICULTY IN PROVIDING QUALIFIED PERSONNEL.

13 (D). N/A
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13 (E). SEE (A), (B), AND (C) ABOVE.

13 (F). USDAO, GHANA CONSISTS OF ONE DATT (06), ONE OPERATIONS COORDINATOR (W1), ONE INTELLIGENCE SPECIALIST (E5) AND ONE PART TIME (20 HR/WK), CIVILIAN SECURITY ASSISTANCE CLERK-TYPIST (GS5). THIS IS MINIMUM MANNING POSSIBLE FOR PROGRAM LEVELS 1 AND 2. IT IS NOT ADEQUATE FOR PROGRAM LEVEL 3. AT THE LEAST CLERK-TYPIST POSITION SHOULD BE AUTHORIZED AS FULL TIME POSITION. ANY EXPANSION OF PROGRAM ABOVE LEVEL 3 WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUGMENTATION BEYOND ONE FULL TIME CLERK TYPIST.

13 (G). N/A

13 (H). ALL TRAINING IS PROPOSED FOR IMET. ALL TRAINING IS SCHEDULED FOR CONUS. IMET IS THE PREMIER PROGRAM IN SUPPORT OF OUR INTERESTS IN GHANA (CLOSE AND CONTINUOUS CONTACT WITH THE GHANA MILITARY AND MAXIMUM EXPOSURE TO US METHODS, CHARACTERISTICS AND TECHNOLOGY). THE PROPOSED TRAINING IS NOT AVAILABLE FROM INDIGENOUS SOURCES. THIRD COUNTRY SOURCES WOULD BE COUNTER-PRODUCTIVE TO US INTERESTS, E.G., CLOSE AND CONTINUING US CONTACT WITH GHANA ARMED FORCES. FMS WOULD EXPOSE GHANA MILITARY PERSONNEL TO US ENVIRONMENT, IF GHANA COULD AFFORD AFFORD EXPENSE, BUT ON A SELLER/BUYER BASIS AS OPPOSED TO THE PRESENT FRIENDLY FELLOW PROFESSIONAL STATUS WE ENJOY.

US MILITARY TRAINING FOR GHANA CONCENTRATES ON THOSE COURSES WHICH HAVE UTILITY IN CIVILIAN AS WELL AS MILITARY SPHERES.

THE PROPOSED FY-79 PROGRAM, AS FOLLOWS, IS MODEL, REFLECTING BOTH TYPE OF TRAINING AND APPROXIMATE NUMBERS OF TO TRAINED, PROJECTED THROUGH FY-82.

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I. MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATIVE COURSES

A. COMMAND AND STAFF SCHOOLS	10
B. FINANCE MANAGEMENT	5
C. PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT	2
D. LOG EXECUTIVE DEVELOPMENT	1

II. TECHNICAL COURSES

A. MEDICAL	6
B. ADPS	5
C. SIGNAL	5
D. MILITARY POLICE	3
E. TRANSPORTATION	3
F. PUBLIC AFFAIRS	3
G. ENGINEER	2
H. ORDNANCE	2
I. ADPS	2
J. JAG	1
K. CHAPLAIN	1
L. MECHANIC (HELO)	1
M. PARACHUTE RIGGER	1

III. MILITARY COURSES

A. INFANTRY	5
B. RANGER/AIRBORNE	3
C. INTELLIGENCE	2
D. PSYOPS	1
E. ARMOR	1

13 (I). WE PROPOSE ONLY IMET FOR GHANA, AND THAT UNDER GRANT AID. AS COVERED IN 13 (C) ABOVE, WE FEEL THAT CURRENT LEVEL (60 TO 65 STUDENTS ANNUALLY) IS OPTIMUM TO OUR BEST INTERESTS. WE SEE THIS CURRENT IMET LEVEL AS

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CONTINUING REQUIREMENT IN FY-80 THROUGH FY-82.

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